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From Corporatism to Partisan Politics. Social Policy Making
under Strain in Switzerland
Abstract
The literature on neo-corporatist agreements in social and labor market policy in the 1990s points to a
decline of concertation in European countries with a long-standing tradition of corporatist negotiation.
This article identifies a similar trend in Switzerland and argues that three destabilizing factors account
for it: 1) retrenchment pressure and ideological polarization prevent compromises; 2) the emergence of
new social demands and interests challenges the homogeneity and legitimacy of peak organizations and
thus their bargaining power; 3) increasing media coverage tends to open up the traditionally confidential
and selective sphere of corporatist negotiation and weakens the social partners' ability to reach
agreements. The impact of these factors on neo-corporatist bargaining is tested in Switzerland, a case
where corporatist negotiations used to be particularly decisive in social policy making. Empirical
evidence comes from a cross-time comparison of two major social policies: Unemployment insurance
and pension reforms in the 1970s and in the 1990s. In the last decade, the main locus of decision-making
shifted from the sphere of interest groups to partisan politics. In parliament, the political parties were
able to draft bills enjoying wide acceptance thanks to compensations offered to groups particularly
vulnerable to new social risks.
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Abstract
The literature on neo-corporatist agreements in social and labor market 
policy in the 1990s points to a decline of concertation in European countries 
with a long-standing tradition of corporatist negotiation. This article 
identifies a similar trend in Switzerland and argues that three destabilizing 
factors account for it: 1) retrenchment pressure and ideological polarization 
prevent compromises; 2) the emergence of new social demands and interests 
challenges the homogeneity and legitimacy of peak organizations and thus 
their bargaining power; 3) increasing media coverage tends to open up the 
traditionally confidential and selective sphere of corporatist negotiation and 
weakens the social partners’ ability to reach agreements. 
The impact of these factors on neo-corporatist bargaining is tested in 
Switzerland, a case where corporatist negotiations used to be particularly 
decisive in social policy making. Empirical evidence comes from a cross-
time comparison of two major social policies: Unemployment insurance 
and pension reforms in the 1970s and in the 1990s. In the last decade, the 
main locus of decision-making shifted from the sphere of interest groups 
to partisan politics. In parliament, the political parties were able to draft 
bills enjoying wide acceptance thanks to compensations offered to groups 
particularly vulnerable to new social risks.
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Introduction
In the recent decade, corporatism has come under strain in countries where 
stable arrangements used to secure concertation in policy-making between the 
major interest groups. Although in some – mostly southern European - countries, 
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new “social pacts” could be established, countries with a long-standing tradition 
of highly formalized corporatist negotiations, such as Austria, Denmark or the 
Netherlands, experienced a reverse trend: social partners lost power to the 
benefit of partisan actors. Talos and Kittel (2002) show that in Austria pre-
parliamentary corporatist negotiations have to a large extent lost their central 
importance, and that the government played a growing role. For Denmark, 
Blom-Hansen (2001) also points to a weakening of the influence of corporatist 
actors, because institutionalized tripartite concertation on social and labor 
market policy has been replaced by more informal consultation mechanisms. He 
attributes this evolution mainly to the governmental will to cut expenditures, 
but also to a general decline in the legitimacy of corporatist agreements “reached 
in smoke-filled rooms rather than in parliament”. In the Netherlands, although 
social partnership was to a large extent maintained in the 1990s, Anderson (2001) 
and Slomp (2002) also identified a trend from concertation to less binding forms 
of consultation after the accession to power of the social-liberal government in 
1994. The legitimacy of corporatist negotiations was called into question by the 
parties in power , which claimed “more responsibility for politics” (Slomp 2002: 
243), i.e. the primacy of democratically elected bodies over corporatist boards.
We identify a similar trend in social policy reforms in Switzerland during the 1990s. 
Switzerland is a particularly interesting case since it has always been considered 
as a country where very powerful interest associations confront weak national 
political parties and a weak central state, notably in the field of social policy (Kriesi 
1980 and 1998). The literature on corporatism in Switzerland has mainly pointed to 
the stability of policy concertation (Armingeon 1997 and 1998). However, despite 
the persistence of corporatist negotiations prior to parliamentary debates, the 
social partners have largely lost their dominant position in policy-making, because 
they have been unable to reach agreements on several important reforms of basic 
pillars of the Swiss welfare state. This weakening of the neo-corporatist arena of 
decision-making coincides with a shift of the main locus of decision-making to the 
parliamentary arena, which is becoming increasingly active in social policy. The 
interaction between different arenas (corporatist, governmental, parliamentary) 
of the policy process has been only marginally investigated in the welfare state 
literature. Yet we believe this is a promising avenue for understanding the 
dynamics of social policy reforms. 
Our study first seeks to identify the factors which are at the origin of the 
decline of corporatist arrangements in Switzerland. We examine two major factors 
emphasized in the literature and we propose a new variable which has, up to now, 
been largely neglected in research on corporatism. First, pressures for welfare state 
retrenchment have increased the polarization between competing interests (mainly 
employers and labor unions) and rendered compromises more difficult (Pierson 
2001; Bonoli et al. 2000). Second, it has also been argued that interests are generally 
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becoming more heterogeneous and that corporatist actors – notably trade unions 
– are experiencing difficulty in responding adequately to newly emerging social 
demands, which may undermine their capacity to reach legitimate agreements 
(Crepaz 1994; Streeck 1993). Finally, a third factor, usually overlooked by specialists 
of social policy and emphasized by communication researchers, has contributed to 
increasing difficulties in achieving corporatist arrangements: the transformation of 
contemporary political systems into “audience democracies” (Manin 1997), where 
the media play a central role. We hypothesize that increasing media coverage of 
policy making processes weakens the capacity of corporatist actors to produce 
compromises, because effective cooperation requires a sphere of confidential 
negotiation. In the first part of the article, we discuss these three explanatory factors 
which are expected to account for the declining role of corporatist negotiations and 
we trace their evolution between the 1970s and the 1990s in Switzerland.
In the second part of the article, qualitative studies on two crucial social policy 
reforms (pension and unemployment policies), based on documentary analysis and 
in-depth interviews with key actors of the reforms, allow to assess empirically how 
the three aforementioned factors influenced the corporatist negotiations, and why 
there was a shift of the main locus of decision-making from corporatist negotiations 
to the parliament. The study of these two social policy domains is particularly 
relevant, because both policies were subject to major reforms in the 1990s as well as 
in the 1970s, which allows a cross-time comparison of the interactions between the 
corporatist and the partisan arenas.1
Corporatist negotiations under pressure 
During the period of economic growth, neo-corporatist negotiations appeared to 
be particularly efficient in dealing with social policy issues. However, in many 
small European corporatist countries such as Austria, Denmark or – to some extent 
– the Netherlands, this was no longer true during the last decade, which was 
characterized by strong pressures for welfare retrenchment (Talos and Kittel 2002; 
Blom-Hansen 2001; Mailand 2002; Slomp 2002 and Anderson 2001). In Switzerland 
too, the major interest groups were not able to find an agreement on pension policy 
reform, nor on unemployment insurance reform. In the following, we analyze 
the three main explanatory factors for this declining relevance of corporatist 
concertation for social policy-making.
1 This article is part of a research project “Reshaping decision making processes under 
external pressure”, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant number: 5004-
058511/1) and directed by Prof. Yannis Papadopoulos. An earlier draft of this article has 
been presented at the annual congress of the Swiss Political Science Association, (Fribourg, 
8/9.11.2001). We would like to thank the workshop participants for helpful comments.
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Welfare state retrenchment and ideological polarization
In times of economic recession, budget deficits in state households, socio-
demographic pressures on the pension system, and pressure on taxation and 
spending levels stemming from increasing global economic competition, 
the policy objectives of business and labor unions tend to become 
increasingly divergent. While employers pressure for retrenchment, trade 
unions emphasize the increasing social demand for welfare provisions in 
times of crisis. Polarization in discourse and policy positions increases, 
which makes agreements on reforms more difficult (Pierson 2001; Bonoli 
et al. 2000; Bonoli 1999). Hence, even though social partners may continue 
to negotiate on policy reform, they may be unable to agree on a common 
project. 
Evidence on budget deficits and retrenchment pressure, as well as on 
polarization between the social partners in Switzerland indicates important 
changes since the 1970s. Rapid demographic ageing and the severe 
economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s produced, for the first time, 
large deficits in the realms of pensions and unemployment insurance. In the 
case of pensions, there were annual surpluses of several billions of Swiss 
francs until 1992, but they dropped rapidly in 1993 and 1994, becoming 
deficits for the first time ever in 1995. As for unemployment insurance, the 
existing system was completely incapable of handling the sharp increase 
in unemployment in Switzerland at the beginning of the 1990s (from 0.5% 
in 1990 to almost 5% in 1994, then stagnating at this level until 1997 and 
declining again to 2% in 2000). Thus, the balance of account dropped from 
a large surplus to a profound deficit in the mid-1990s.
We also observe a growing polarization of positions between the social 
partners. Taking as an indicator of polarization the percentage of 
referendum votes for which the main peak associations of employers (Union 
of Swiss Employers’ Associations, UPS; Small Business Association, USAM) 
and of trade unions (Federation of Swiss Trade Unions, USS) gave the same 
voting recommendation, we note in table 1 that divergences considerably 
increased in the 1990s in comparison to previous years.
An expression of this hardening of positions was a “manifesto for a 
social moratorium” against any increase in social security expenditures 
published by the UPS in 1993. In reaction, the trade unions also expressed 
more clear-cut positions against welfare state retrenchment (Interviews 4 
and 5, see appendix).
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Table 1: Comparison of the congruence in the positions of the main peak associations 2
Rate of congruence
1970-1990 (158 popular votes)
Rate of congruence
1991-2000 (106 popular votes)
UPS-USS
USAM-USS
0.51 (111 votes taken into account)
0.36 (125 votes taken into account)
0.35 (60 votes taken into account)
0.23 (76 votes taken into account)
Source: data bank on voting recommendations available at University of Lausanne 
(Prof. Y. Papadopoulos)
Declining legitimacy of peak associations
The second factor which is likely to weaken the role of corporatist negotiation 
is the declining legitimacy of employers’ and trade unions’ peak associations. 
The recent literature has argued that the representativeness of peak associations 
is increasingly being questioned for several reasons. The liberalization of 
international markets tends to reinforce the heterogeneity of business interests, 
between export-oriented companies and the economic sectors producing for the 
domestic market, with a negative effect on the internal cohesion of employers’ 
organizations (Keohane and Milner 1996). This trend is, however, less relevant 
for the field of social policy, since the internal cohesion of business is more 
deeply affected on issues concerning market liberalization. 
As for trade unions, they are confronted with the challenge of representing 
an ever more diverse constituency of interests. Heterogeneity of interests stems 
from diverse changes such as the general shift in employment to the service 
sector, the growth of women’s participation in the labor market, the expansion of 
atypical part-time and short-term employment, or the growing individualization 
of lifestyles and normative orientations (Streeck 1993: 84). In this context, Pierson 
(2001: 421) speaks of emerging demands and reforms to “update” the welfare 
state, i.e. to adapt it to the altering social and labor market structures, to the 
benefit of new risk groups, such as divorced women, single mothers, part-time 
workers or the long-term unemployed, which are often insufficiently protected 
by “old” welfare states. Such new concerns, as calls for gender equality in welfare 
policies, for instance, tend to blur the traditional class conflict between labor and 
capital by introducing a value cleavage in social policy debates (Crepaz 1994). 
Trade unions are challenged by these demands, notably because the new groups 
at risk rarely belong to their traditional clientele. These factors affect the internal 
cohesion and the power of trade unions and may thus undermine corporatist 
bargaining in social policy reforms affected by new social demands. 
 
2 The relatively high number of missing values is explained by the fact that social partners 
do not express voting recommendations on issues which are not of interest to them.
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Unlike corporatist actors, political parties are expected to react with more flexibility 
to these new concerns, notably because of their periodical exposure to electoral 
competition: “Corporatism is designed to represent material interests. (…) While 
the parties have eventually caught up with the changes in society, the corporatist 
system is still lagging behind precisely because of its closed, centralized, hierarchical 
character” (Crepaz 1994: 47). The result would be an increasing divergence between 
political parties and corporatist actors, most of all between the social-democratic 
parties and trade unions.
Indicators measuring the respective capacity of trade unions and parties to 
take into account new social demands are, unfortunately, virtually absent. A 
measurable approximation is the reference to the post-materialist dimension 
of many of the new demands. In order to highlight the gap between the 
trade unions and the Social Democratic Party in Switzerland with respect 
to materialism/post-materialism, we rely therefore on the evolution of this 
cleavage among union members and sympathizers of the Social Democratic 
Party.3 Already in the 1970s, the social-democratic basis was more open to post-
materialist values than trade union members. In addition, more than a third of 
trade union members affirmed clearly materialist values, while this was true for 
only a fifth of the social democrats. In the 1990s, this picture has changed in two 
respects. Firstly, post-materialist values have considerably gained in importance 
within the trade union membership, which is now rather equally divided 
between materialists and post-materialists. Secondly, however, materialism has 
weakened massively among sympathizers of the Social Democratic Party, while 
post-materialist values have become clearly predominant. These results taken 
from survey data support the theoretical argument according to which unions 
are supposed to be still more receptive to materialist concerns and less open to 
post-materialist issues than parties of the left.
Increasing media coverage
The increasing importance of media coverage, partly linked to growing 
polarization, is also likely to inhibit compromises in corporatist bargaining. The 
importance of the mass media has risen sharply in our societies during the last 
decades. This transformation of mass communications has also had an impact 
on political reporting. According to Pfetsch (1998), the growing competition 
between media suppliers gives rise to a kind of political journalism which 
focuses more on investigation and personalization. With the transformation and 
3 These results are based on survey data. For a detailed analysis of the Social Democrats, 
see Sgier (2002), and for trade union members, see Geissbühler (2000). On the measurement 
of materialism/post-materialism, see Inglehart (1977).
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expansion of their role, the media have become not only a strategic resource 
for political actors, but also an important political actor in their own right 
(Kriesi 2001). 
We argue that this evolution towards an “audience democracy”, although 
usually neglected by studies on social policy, also has an impact on the arena of 
corporatist negotiations. Effective cooperation requires a relatively non-transparent 
and selective sphere of confidential negotiation, which promotes mutual confidence 
between social partners (Benz 1998; Papadopoulos 2003). Increasing media 
coverage, by contrast, heightens the tension between the “logic of influence”, 
which is compromise-oriented and prevalent among the negotiators of corporatist 
organizations, and the “logic of membership” that stresses fidelity to the objectives 
of their respective reference groups (Schmitter and Streeck 1981).
Few data exists on the evolution of media coverage concerning social policy 
issues in Switzerland. Table 2, however, gives some useful indications. It shows 
the number of articles on pension reforms and on unemployment policy that were 
published in a selection of the most important Swiss German newspapers during 
the periods when these issues were prominent in the media.
Table 2: Number of press articles on social policy reforms
Pension policy    Unemployment policy “Future of the welfare state”
8th reform of pension 
system 1970-72: 101 articles 
introduction of 
mandatory insurance 1976: 13 articles Before 1990 0 articles*
9th reform of pension 
system 1977-79: 58 articles 
 10th reform of 
pension system 1994-95: 112 articles






Source: data bank “Kommunikationsereignisse 1920–1997”; www.foeg.unizh.ch; the data bank covers the 
20 most important issues for each of 5 major German-speaking newspapers. Importance is measured by the 
number of articles published every year on a specific issue. 
* This absence is related to the fact that the future of the welfare state has become an important issue in the 
newspapers only since the early 1990s. Thus, this topic does not appear before in the data set which includes 
only the 20 most prominent issues. 
According to this data, the pension issue has had a high profile in the 
media in the past too, given the relatively widespread media coverage of the 
two major reforms of the 1970s.4 Nevertheless, what is special about the most 
recent reforms is that they were already a prominent issue during the pre-
parliamentary negotiations between 1985 and 1988 (32 articles), while for the 
4 The 9th reform was mainly about the financial consolidation of the pension system. 
Because the scope of that reform was narrower compared to the 8th and to the 10th reform, 
we do not analyse it in detail. 
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previous reforms the issue was mostly covered only during the parliamentary 
and referendum phases5. As far as unemployment policy is concerned, we note a 
striking increase in media coverage. This policy field was only sparsely covered 
when mandatory insurance was first introduced, but it became one of the most 
central media issues in the 1990s. Another striking difference in comparison 
with the 1970s is the emergence of important general discussions in the media 
on the future of the welfare state. Before the 1990s this topic never featured 
among the most important issues. So, there has indeed been an overall increase 
in media coverage of social policy issues since the 1970s, which has been largely 
confirmed by our interviewees. All of them explicitly stated that the influence 
of the media on the reform processes has grown considerably over the last 
decade. The director of the employers’ association UPS, for instance, deplored 
the fact that nowadays almost every session of the pre-parliamentary committee 
is followed by a press conference, with the consequence that the social partners 
continually have to comment publicly on their interim results and to reiterate 
their objectives (Interview 7, see appendix). After this, they have to return to 
the negotiation table, where a different, consensus-oriented logic should prevail. 
The leader of the USS trade union also noted that the media have become a 
more important actor in their own right, and that the social partners must keep 
them informed on the negotiations at ever earlier stages of the reform processes 
(Interview 3, see appendix). 
Thus, the evolution of the three explanatory factors considered (growing 
retrenchment pressure and polarization, the decline in the representativeness of peak 
associations, increasing media coverage) highlights important changes between the 
1970s and the 1990s in the context of corporatist negotiations. 
Changing roles of negotiation arenas: Evidence from two major social 
policy reforms
The declining relevance of corporatist negotiations between social partners 
in Switzerland is particularly striking, since the literature has traditionally 
identified them as the decisive stage in Swiss decision-making processes (Kriesi 
1980; Zehnder 1988; Poitry 1989 and Sciarini 1999). In this pre-parliamentary 
corporatist arena, interest organizations, experts and bureaucrats negotiate in 
specialized committees. Bills are drafted in these expert committees before they 
are handed over to the governmental and parliamentary arena. Zehnder (1988) 
has shown that between 1971 and 1974, only about one third of these bills have 
5 The pre-parliamentary corporatist negotiations took place in 1969-70 for the 8th reform 
(18 articles) and in 1976-77 for the 9th reform (10 articles) of the pension system. 
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subsequently been modified in parliament, and not more than 6,4% of them 
have been modified substantially. In general, the earlier a point of intervention 
was situated in the decision-making process, the more important it could be 
considered (Kriesi 1980), a finding that points out the dominant position of the 
corporatist actors as opposed to political parties.6 In addition, opponents can 
challenge every law adopted in parliament by gathering 50’000 signatures for 
a popular referendum in the direct democratic arena. The threat of launching a 
referendum exerts a pressure for compromise-seeking from the very beginning 
of the process onwards. Hence, the predominant role of pre-parliamentary 
corporatist negotiations has often been explained by the existence of the 
referendum as an important veto point in the Swiss political system (Neidhart 
1970). 
The four decision-making processes in pension policy and unemployment 
insurance analyzed in this article are of particular relevance, not only because 
both the pension scheme and unemployment insurance were subject to 
reforms in the 1970s as well as in the 1990s, but also because all four reforms 
were of major importance. The 8th pension reform as well as the introduction of a 
constitutional article on employment insurance in 1976 belong to the most important 
reforms of the 1970s, as identified by Kriesi (1980). Similarly, the 10th reform of the 
pension scheme and the reform of unemployment insurance (both adopted in 1995) 
had high prominence on the reform agenda of the 1990s and constituted turning 
points in both fields of social insurance.7 
The 8th reform of the old age pension scheme in 1972 and the adoption 
of a new constitutional article on unemployment insurance in 1976 perfectly 
illustrate the traditional Swiss decision-making patterns outlined above. When 
comparing them with the two reform processes on similar issues in the 1990s, we 
find important changes.
The reconstruction of the decision-making processes of the 1970s is based 
on secondary literature. As to the reform processes of the 1990s, on which this 
article is focused, our case studies are based: a) on public and confidential 
6 As Kriesi (1980: 589) puts it: “Ganz allgemein kann man sagen, dass dem Parlament, 
und damit dem Parteiensystem, dessen Fokus im Staat das Parlament darstellt, bestenfalls 
die Funktion eines Korrektivs zukommt“. On the basis of network analysis, he identified 
the most important collective political actors in Swiss decision-making during the 1970s, 
and found that the four major peak economic associations (with the government) ranked 
above the political parties. Similarly, among the “inner circle” of the most influential 
individual actors (27 persons), there are only four “pure” parliamentarians (without any 
leadership function in interest groups), compared to 9 representatives of the peak economic 
associations and 12 administrative or governmental actors (Kriesi 1998: 282 and 288).
7 Old age pension and unemployment policy figure also prominently in Bonoli’s (1999) 
study of Swiss welfare state retrenchment.
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documentary sources such as the governmental “message” to the parliament, 
minutes of the meetings of expert and parliamentary committees, plenary 
parliamentary debates, expert reports, publications of political parties and 
interest associations, and b) on 11 elite interviews with the key actors of the two 
decision-making processes (see appendix for a list of the interviews).
Before explaining in more detail the changing patterns of decision-making in 
the 1990s, we provide in this chapter a brief comparative overview of the four 
reform processes. The departure from traditional decision-making patterns is 
presented for the corporatist arena in a first step and for the role of parliament 
in a second step.
The corporatist arena: from compromise to deadlock
The main goal of the 8th pension reform of 1972 was to increase basic pensions 
significantly to a level allowing the beneficiaries to have a decent standard of 
living (for more details on this reform, see Kriesi 1980 and Binswanger 1987). The 
social partners and the cantons negotiated the reform in the pre-parliamentary 
federal expert committee. An agreement was reached within about one year 
between the defenders of an 80% rise and those fighting for the doubling of 
the existing pensions and the bill was unanimously approved by the members 
of the committee. Similarly to pension reform, the unemployment insurance 
reform of the 1970s was based on a broad consensus among the social partners, 
since the main objective of generalizing insurance coverage remained largely 
uncontested (for more details on this reform, see Kriesi 1980 and Bonnebault et 
al. 1995). Concertation took place in an ad hoc expert committee, which included 
representatives of business and labor unions, cantonal governments and private 
experts. After about one year of negotiation, this committee adopted a proposal 
for the creation of a mandatory federal insurance financed through equal 
contributions from employers and employees. To strengthen this agreement, the 
social partners even jointly published a statement in which they appealed to the 
parliament for rapid enactment of the reform.
In contrast to the pension reform of the 1970s, pre-parliamentary 
negotiations for the 10th reform of the Swiss pension scheme were fastidious and 
much longer. This reform was supposed to introduce gender equality in the 
old age insurance, since the previous system generally disadvantaged married 
women who lost their earned entitlement to a pension in favor of the husband’s 
entitlement, a system that created severe financial problems particularly for 
divorced women. Left-wing political actors as well as women’s organizations 
thus urged for a so-called “splitting-system”, in which the contributions of both 
spouses would be added, divided by two and counted separately. Additionally, 
right-wing political actors demanded a rise in the retirement age for women 
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from 62 to 65, initially for reasons of gender equality, but increasingly because 
of financial pressure on the pension system. During the pre-parliamentary 
corporatist negotiations (from 1985 to 1989), the social partners failed to reach 
an agreement in the federal expert committee. The negotiations were blocked 
on the issue of the age of retirement, on which trade unions and business 
organizations were in direct opposition. In 1987, the Federation of Swiss Trade 
Unions (USS) and the Social Democratic Party chose to “go public”, claiming 
retirement at sixty-two for both sexes in a widely diffused publication,8 while 
the Radical Democratic Party and the Union of Swiss Employers’ Associations 
(UPS) published a statement in favor of generalized retirement at 65.9 The 
issue of “splitting”, for which both actors had shown a certain interest, became 
of only secondary importance in the shadow of the controversy on the age 
of retirement. “Splitting” was also criticized by employers, who feared the 
increase in administrative costs. For the trade unions, on the other hand, the 
question of the retirement age became predominant, since it directly concerned 
union members, whereas “splitting” was mainly targeted at women absent 
from the labor market and not unionized. The draft bill finally handed over 
by the government to the parliament reflected the failure of pre-parliamentary 
compromise-seeking, since it contained only very minor amendments, leaving 
aside the issues of “splitting” and the equalization of the age of retirement. 
A similar failure of pre-parliamentary compromise-seeking can be observed 
in the case of unemployment insurance reform. Reacting to the sudden increase in 
unemployment in the beginning of the 1990s, the parliament adopted in 1993 
an emergency decree raising the number of daily compensation payments 
and reducing the replacement rate from 80% to 70%. This emergency decree 
was opposed by the trade unions as well as the employers’ organizations in a 
popular referendum vote, since the former rejected the reduction of benefits 
and the latter demanded more severe cuts. Nevertheless, the emergency decree 
was accepted by a large majority of the voters in autumn 1993. This decisional 
process had a significant impact on the regular reform of unemployment 
insurance, since the pre-parliamentary negotiations for this second reform 
took place parallel to the referendum campaign on the emergency decree. 
In this campaign, the social partners continually restated in the media very 
clear-cut, antagonistic positions on the level of unemployment benefits. This 
made compromise-seeking for the new bill difficult, since the negotiations 
were stuck on roughly the same elements as those of the emergency decree 
8 PSS/USS, Droits égaux dans l’AVS. Propositions du PSS suisse et de l’USS pour la révision 
de l’AVS (Bern: PSS/USS, 1987).
9 PRD, “Avenir de l’AVS. Rapport final d’un groupe de travail du PRD suisse,” Revue 
Politique 67, no. 2 (1988): 34-45.
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(lengths of entitlement period and replacement rate). Given the deadlock in the 
negotiations, the government went on to present a draft bill to the parliament 
which again included most of the controversial elements on which negotiations 
had failed. Unsurprisingly, this project met with heavy criticism from the social 
partners and the political parties.
This brief presentation shows that while in the 1970s, inclusive negotiations 
between the social partners in the pre-parliamentary corporatist arena resulted 
into broad agreements, compromise-seeking in similar negotiations among the 
social partners largely failed in the 1990s, which had important implications also 
for the role of parliament.
The parliamentary arena: from passive approval to decision-making
When the pre-parliamentary agreement on the 8th pension reform was debated in 
parliament, the broad lines of the reform had already been drawn and thus, it 
was approved rapidly and unanimously in 1972 after just one single debate in 
both parliamentary chambers. Quite similarly, the pre-parliamentary agreement 
between the social partners on the introduction of a mandatory federal unemployment 
insurance decisively pre-structured the debates in parliament, where the bill was 
ratified within only a few months without significant modification. Thus, while 
the pre-parliamentary negotiations had taken more than one and a half year, 
both chambers and their preparatory committees finished the debates in less 
than 7 months and approved the bill unanimously. 
Since a consensual corporatist agreement lacked for the 10th reform of the pension 
system, parliamentary debates became far more important than in the 1970s. In 
addition, the advocates of “splitting” had a much better stand in parliament 
than among the social partners and hence, this issue became predominant. After 
about 18 months of debates, the parliamentary committee of the lower chamber 
reached an agreement on “splitting” and on educational benefits. This proposal 
was strongly supported notably by the Radical Democratic and by the Social 
Democratic Parties. Hence, a “social-liberal coalition” in parliament was able to 
foster an agreement on this novel issue. Some members of the Radical Democratic 
Party, however, then raised again the demand for a rise in women’s retirement 
age, which was set, after brief but controversial debates, at sixty-four by a right-
wing majority against the Social Democratic Party. The trade unions, for whom the 
age-issue was clearly predominant, launched a referendum against the pension 
reform, forcing the Social Democrats to clearly define their priorities, because a 
popular rejection of the law would also imply losing the benefits of “splitting”. 
The Social Democratic Party finally decided in favor of “splitting”, i.e. in favor 
of the parliamentary agreement and against the referendum. In the end, only the 
trade unions opposed the reform which was largely accepted by the voters. 
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The parliament acquired a similarly important role in the reform of the 
unemployment insurance, on which the social partners had failed to negotiate a 
compromise, so that trade unions and employers’ organizations remained firmly 
opposed to the governmental proposal. Therefore, the parliamentary committee 
of the lower chamber brought the corporatist actors back to the negotiation table 
and orchestrated an entirely new compromise. The complete reorientation of 
the reform towards an active labor market policy allowed both trade unions 
and employers’ organizations to give their consent to the new reform package. 
The new compromise combined the extension of the entitlement period with 
obligations for the unemployed to take part in active labor market programs in 
order to be eligible for further payments. After the new compromise had again 
been put into question by the cantons who feared important cost increases, the 
parliamentary committees of both chambers organized common negotiations 
together with the social partners, members of cantonal governments and top 
civil servants, where a final compromise could be reached. The bill was finally 
accepted by all political parties, the social partners and the cantons. 
The two reform processes of the 1990s show that major changes in social 
policy have increasingly been decided in the party-parliamentary arena instead 
of remaining under the pre-parliamentary control of the social partners. This 
weakening of corporatist bargaining is related to factors such as retrenchment 
pressure, polarization, media coverage or the declining legitimacy of peak 
associations. We first seek to further substantiate this explanation in the next 
part, before explaining the leadership role taken over by the parliament.
Explaining the weakening of corporatist negotiations
The factors accounting for the increasing difficulty in compromise-building 
are to some extent interrelated. Retrenchment pressure leads to polarization 
of discourse, which is sustained by media interest. This contributes to the 
increasing inability of peak associations to reach widely accepted compromises. 
In addition, the declining representativeness of corporatist actors tends to 
undermine their legitimacy.
Retrenchment pressure, polarization and media coverage
In both reforms, retrenchment pressure and polarization were conducive 
to deadlock in the pre-parliamentary corporatist negotiations. Switzerland 
was confronted in the 1990s with very low economic growth and rising social 
expenditure in the fields of unemployment insurance and old age pensions. 
Such a context creates a need to increase social benefits while requiring a tighter 
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control of public expenditure (Bonoli et al. 2000). These divergent pressures 
favored a very polarized political climate in Switzerland where corporatist 
actors defended unusually hard-line positions in the media.
In the pension reform, the positions taken on the retirement age were too 
divergent to make any agreement possible. Moreover, the age issue became 
an extremely high profile topic in the media during the 1990s. The Social 
Democratic Party and the trade unions as well as the Radical Democratic 
Party and the employers chose a “going-public” strategy, affirming in widely 
diffused publications their firm positions on retirement age and fostering 
thereby a widespread debate in the newspapers (see also table 2 above). This 
early publication of the negotiation positions made concertation on the issue 
particularly difficult, since every concession would have been easily interpreted 
by the media and by the rank-and-file as a sign of weakness. By choosing an 
early “going public” strategy, the social partners themselves reduced their 
chances of reaching a compromise on old age pension reform. 
The trade unions’ and employers’ positions on how to react to the 
unemployment crisis were also very polarized. While the unions demanded 
an increase in benefits for the unemployed, employers’ organizations mostly 
wanted to enhance the pressure on unemployed people to accept any new job 
as quickly as possible. In addition, the parallel media campaign concerning the 
referendum on the emergency decree in 1993 meant that the main issues on 
which no agreement could be found were already being heatedly debated in 
public. The director of the federal Office of Industry, Crafts and Labor confirmed 
this polarizing effect of the parallel media campaign (Interview 2). He stated that 
the social partners were caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, they advocated 
intransigent positions in order to reject the emergency decree, while on the 
other hand, they had to negotiate on the very same issues in order to reach a 
compromise for the new bill. Thus, the corporatist negotiations were blocked 
on these “hot” issues. The subsequent reorientation of the reform towards an 
active labor market policy, by contrast, facilitated compromises, mainly because 
it allowed social partners to maintain their polarized discourse: the active labor 
market measures could be seen either as a right of the beneficiaries to have 
access to vocational training, a claim raised by trade unions, or as their duty 
to “deserve” compensation benefits (workfare), a point on which employers 
insisted heavily (Interviews 4 and 7).
The intransigence of the social partners in both reform processes should be seen in 
the context of a more general polarization of discourse in Swiss corporatist relations 
of the 1990s. The claim for a less consensual attitude on the part of the employers was 
raised in two “white books”, published in 1991 and 1995, which presented programs 
for neo-liberal reforms in economic and social policies (for more details, see Mach 
2004). These books were published by major economic leaders of the largest export-
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oriented Swiss companies. In reaction to these white books, the Swiss Federation of 
Commerce and Industry (USCI) provided a more radical message in favor of market 
liberalization and welfare state retrenchment.10
Compromise-seeking in the pre-parliamentary negotiations was then 
hampered by the overall polarization, which was reinforced by the strong 
media coverage of the reforms. Nevertheless, the growing polarization did not 
bring into question the social partners’ participation in negotiations on social 
policy reforms in expert committees. Trade union leaders, top civil servants 
and the director of the UPS affirmed that they remained open to negotiation on 
the reforms, and that they never attacked the existence of corporatist decision-
making as such, even if no agreements could be found (Interviews 2, 3, 5 and 7). 
The deadlock in both cases, however, highlighted the difficulties experienced by 
the representatives of trade unions and employers’ organizations in reconciling 
an increasingly confrontational attitude expressed in the media and towards 
their members (“logic of membership”) with the day-to-day negotiation of social 
policy reforms in the corporatist arena (“logic of influence”).
The declining role of social partners
A further explanatory factor for the failure of compromise-seeking in the pre-
parliamentary corporatist arena is the declining legitimacy of peak organizations 
due to the emergence of new social demands and groups at risk which the social 
partners, principally the trade unions, have difficulty to integrate. It was mostly 
in the pension reform that the growing heterogeneity of preferences became very 
important in explaining the new patterns of social policy-making. The trade-off 
between protecting the traditional trade union clientele – mainly male labor market 
insiders – or protecting new groups at risk - mainly female labor market outsiders 
- divided the left and fostered new reform coalitions in the parliamentary arena.
In the case of pension reform, new social demands for a better individual old 
age protection of women strengthened the heterogeneity within and between the 
trade unions and the Social Democratic Party. In line with Crepaz’ (1994) and 
Streeck’s (1993) arguments, the trade unions were unable to adequately take into 
account the new demands to “update” the welfare state. Gender equality and 
improved old age insurance for (divorced) women gained sufficient support 
only in parliament, when broad factions of the Social Democratic and the Radical 
Democratic parties, as well as some female representatives of the trade unions, 
insisted on the “splitting” of contributions and pensions between husband and 
wife. As “splitting” is a demand rather independent of labor market participation 
10 The USCI represents the employers mainly in economic and fiscal policy issues, 
whereas the UPS deals primarily with social and labour market policy. 
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and a gender issue rather than a traditional issue of material redistribution, 
it remained a secondary point for employers and unions compared with the 
retirement age.
In the case of unemployment insurance reform, a newly created association 
of unemployed people defended very clear-cut left wing positions that the USS 
had difficulty to represent in the negotiation arena. At the end of the decision 
making process, this single issue actor even tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to launch 
a referendum against the new law. Its claims weakened the internal cohesion of 
the left and in particular of the trade unions. The latter were not accustomed to the 
claims of labor market outsiders, since unemployment had always been virtually 
non-existent in Switzerland.
It is interesting to note that both reforms for which we observed a 
reconfiguration of decision-making patterns converged towards the provision 
of compensations for new social groups at risk, instead of the traditional 
beneficiaries of public welfare. The reform of unemployment insurance was 
focused on the creation of active labor market measures in favor of the long-term 
unemployed, and pension reform mainly benefited women with insufficient 
old age protection due to interrupted employment biographies. Hence, both 
types of compensation were not clearly targeted at the core categories of trade 
union members. New groups at risk tend to have different advocates from the 
traditional beneficiaries of social policies, a fact that paves the way for new 
dynamics of reform in this policy field. Partisan actors, for instance, are less 
closely linked to the traditional constituencies of the welfare state. Therefore, 
the shift from the corporatist arena to the parliament also had important 
implications for the content of the reforms.
The rising role of partisan politics
The declining importance of the corporatist arena of policy making raises questions 
about the redistribution of power towards alternative arenas of decision-making, 
such as the government or the parliament. In most other small European neo-
corporatist countries, the decline of corporatist compromises was combined with 
a reinforcement of the governmental position in policy-making. In Switzerland, 
however, it was in the parliamentary arena that the main elements of the reform 
packages were introduced.
The strengthening of the parliamentary arena
Several factors explain the increasing importance of the parliamentary arena in Swiss 
decision-making. Firstly and most importantly, not only had the social partners failed 
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to elaborate a viable bill proposal, but so did the government. While it assumed in both 
reform processes a certain procedural leadership by ending the corporatist negotiations 
even though no compromise had been found, it never assumed leadership on 
the substance of the reforms. Instead, the government maintained a traditional 
intermediary position between the social partners by proposing very limited reforms 
in order to avoid strong opposition (in particular through a referendum). In the case of 
pension reform, the government did not dare to propose a rise in women’s retirement 
age to the parliament without counterbalancing this measure of welfare retrenchment 
by any expansive elements, such as “splitting” (Interview 1). It was at the same time 
reluctant to propose a “splitting” model to the parliament, not least because the 
Christian Democratic minister in charge of the reform privileged the traditional scheme 
based on the married couple as the basic unit of insurance. This dilemma resulted in a 
heavily criticized “minimal” reform draft. As to unemployment insurance reform, the 
inability of the government to innovate was partly due to a question of timing, since 
the active labor market measures the federal administration had started to work on 
were not sufficiently developed when the social partners negotiated on the new bill 
(Interview 2). Hence, given the context of crisis, the government proposed a draft bill 
for the unemployment insurance reform that remained very close to the status quo. 
These limited governmental reform drafts were not able to respond to the demands 
of the social partners, neither were they appropriate given the salience of the problems 
to be resolved. Thus, not only did the government not contribute towards breaking the 
deadlock in the corporatist negotiations, but its proposals mirrored or even amplified 
this deadlock. In both cases, the social partners and large sections of the main political 
parties rejected the very limited governmental proposals. Getting ever closer to the 
referendum phase, the pressure for reaching a widely accepted reform proposal 
increased. In this context, the parliamentary committees re-launched the negotiations 
and were able to reformulate the governmental bills completely. While in periods of 
welfare expansion, the threat of a referendum facilitated early compromises in the 
corporatist arena, in a context of retrenchment pressure, corporatist actors are less 
willing to accept concessions and compromises (Bonoli 1999). As trade union leaders 
said, in a polarized context such as in the 1990s, stronger pressure than usual is needed 
to be able to come to an agreement (Interviews 3 and 4). Hence, compromises must all 
the more be found at a later stage of the policy process, notably in the parliamentary 
phase when the referendum threat becomes most imminent.
More generally, it appears that although the existence of multiple veto points in 
Swiss politics is primarily considered to hamper efficient decision-making by raising 
transaction costs between negotiation partners, this is not the only effect veto points 
may have. Veto players able to launch and win referenda have several points of access 
to the decision-making processes. If their claims are not taken adequately into account 
in the corporatist arena, they can reintervene in the parliamentary arena through 
MPs who are sensitive to their demands. This increases the risk of policy blockades, 
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but can also offer new opportunities to avoid them. The duplication of decisional 
circuits can be considered as a mechanism of “institutional redundancy” (Bendor 
1995; on Switzerland see Ossipow 1994), which is a device helping to avoid failure 
in the functioning of a (political) system by enabling an arena to take over an issue 
when solutions could not be found in a previous arena. Redundancy may then have a 
creative potential: it increases the opportunities for reforms. 
It was notably the case of pension reform that revealed a second element 
explaining the increased importance of parliament. Political parties proved to be more 
open to value-based new social demands such as - in that case - gender equality, than 
the social partners. It was the strong interest of the Social Democratic and the Radical 
Democratic MPs in improving the old age protection of married and divorced women 
with interrupted employment careers that allowed these parties to foster a social-liberal 
reform coalition in parliament. Such a reform agreement had not been possible in the 
previous corporatist arena. This is evidenced by the divergent positions between the 
Social Democratic Party and the trade unions on the referendum against the bill. Trade 
unions supported the referendum because they primarily wanted to avoid the rise in 
women’s retirement age at the risk of losing the benefits of the “splitting”, while the 
Social Democratic Party privileged the reverse order of priorities. The argument was 
also confirmed by our interviews. A leading social-democratic trade unionist said that 
it was easier to convince the leaders of the Social Democratic Party of the importance 
of “splitting” than trade union leaders, mostly because the main beneficiaries of the 
“splitting” were women who had not been active on the labor market. Similarly, a 
social-democratic member of the parliamentary committee that drafted the “splitting” 
model also stated that parties were more open to new social demands than interest 
organizations (Interviews 5 and 10). Thus, it was only in the parliamentary arena that 
a solution could be reached with the adoption of the “splitting” model in exchange for 
raising the retirement age.
Finally, other cases of recent social policy reforms, such as the labor law reform of 
1996, the recent reform of the mandatory occupational pensions, the 11th reform of the 
basic pension system and the introduction of financial support for day-care facilities 
for children followed similar patterns of power redistribution.11 Pre-parliamentary 
negotiations between social partners also failed to provide a satisfactory agreement, 
and in parliament the governmental proposals were reformulated to a very large 
extent. In addition, more aggregate studies on the role of parliament also point to 
the growing importance of the parliamentary arena as a decisive locus for decision-
making in Switzerland. Compared to the legislature of 1971-75, the overall percentage 
11 For more details on the labor law reform, see Mach (2004); on the reform of mandatory 
occupational pensions, see Häusermann (2002); on the 11th reform of the basic pension 
system, see Fischer (2002); on the introduction of financial support for day-care facilities for 
children, see Ballestri and Bonoli (2003). 
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of governmental proposals modified in parliament has increased from 39,7 to 44,1% 
between 1991 and 1995 (Linder 1999: 203). Furthermore, Jegher (1999) shows that the 
parliament has become more active especially with regard to social policy issues: 
between 1995 and 1997, about two thirds of the social policy bills have been amended, 
while this was true for only about 35% of the total number of governmental proposals 
(for a similar argument, see also Lüthi 1997).12
The Swiss case in comparative perspective
The weakening of the traditionally predominant role of the major interest groups in 
social policy-making has also been observed in other small corporatist countries such 
as Austria, the Netherlands or Denmark. In these countries, it was the government 
that became a central actor for reform. Relying less than usual on the consent of the 
social partners, it decided more autonomously and “emancipated” itself from the 
neo-corporatist bargaining circuit (Talos and Kittel 2002; Slomp 2002; Blom-Hansen 
2001).13 In Switzerland, by contrast, it was the parliament which took over the role 
previously played by corporatist actors. Hence, its new role in policy-making is rather 
surprising from a comparative perspective. Although this aspect is rarely discussed 
in the comparative literature, we can provide some explanations for this divergent 
pattern of power redistribution. The particularity of the Swiss case cannot be due 
to any significant difference in terms of executive-legislative balance, because all 
the small European countries considered in the literature belong to the category of 
consensual democracies where the executive does not on the whole dominate the 
parliament (Lijphart 1999: 248). Instead, two major arguments can explain the atypical 
Swiss situation. 
First, as explained above, the threat of the popular referendum as a Swiss 
particularity exerts a pressure for compromise-seeking on the decision-making 
12 Lüthi and Jegher mainly explain the rising role of parliament with the replacement in 
1992 of ad hoc parliamentary committees by permanent and specialized committees. This 
institutional explanation confirms and reinforces our argument on the strengthening of the 
parliament in the 1990s. It applies, however, only to the case of unemployment insurance 
reform, since the parliamentary committee in charge of the pension reform was set up on 
the previous, “ad hoc” basis. In addition, to appreciate the respective importance of the 
executive and the legislative, it is also necessary to distinguish between different policy 
fields. In the highly internationalized field of regulatory policy, for instance, governments 
have been strengthened at the expense of interest organizations and parliaments, which can 
largely be explained by their strategic position simultaneously on the external and on the 
domestic scene (see on this issue Moravcsik 1994 and on Switzerland Mach et al. 2003).
13 See, however, Keman (1993) for a diverging interpretation of the Dutch case, where 
he argues that governmental partisan politics have always been predominant in the 
Netherlands.
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process. In times of welfare retrenchment, those agreements are found only 
at the latest possible stage in the policy process, in the parliamentary arena, 
when the referendum threat is most imminent. Second, although Switzerland 
has a coalition government typical of Lijphart’s “consensual” democracies, 
the Swiss federal government does not act on the basis of a real governmental 
program with clear-cut objectives previously negotiated by the coalition parties. 
Hence, the government is not under pressure to take measures compatible with 
such a program, and lacks the necessary legitimacy resources to act in such a 
way, because the governmental parties do not feel constrained by a common 
agreement. This can explain the weak role of the government in welfare reform 
in Switzerland. 
Conclusion
During the 1990s, in the field of social policy, negotiations between the social 
partners in the pre-parliamentary neo-corporatist circuit became increasingly 
difficult compared to the 1970s. Further, we identified a substitution of 
early corporatist compromises by multiparty agreements reached in the 
parliamentary arena. Several factors explain the failure of negotiations 
between trade unions and employers’ organizations in the two cases of 
pension and unemployment policy. Pressures for welfare state retrenchment 
resulting from economic recession, budget deficits and socio-demographic 
factors accentuated the divergence of objectives and the polarization 
of discourse between the corporatist actors. Moreover, media pressure 
contributed to a radicalization and a hardening of their positions. As a result, 
these actors were unable to reach agreements in the corporatist arena, not 
only because of the overall polarization of positions, but also because of their 
inability to respond adequately to new social demands for “updating” the 
welfare state (Pierson 2001), such as claims for gender equality in the case of 
pension policy. 
As to the shift of the main locus of decision-making from the pre-
parliamentary corporatist arena to the party-parliamentary arena, the two case 
studies reveal a rather complex picture. Corporatist compromises which used to 
prevail in the 1970s were not simply replaced by inter-party agreements fostered 
in parliament. As shown in the case of pension reform, the outcome was not 
so much a consensual agreement, although it was supported by all decisive 
political parties, but consisted of a strategically tied-up package of extensive 
and restrictive elements (Bonoli 1999), on which the trade unions and the Social 
Democratic Party were divided. In the case of unemployment insurance reform, 
the drawing up of the final compromise in the parliamentary phase necessitated 
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the participation of actors other than the parties, including again the social 
partners. The innovative compromise achieved was to a large extent jointly the 
work of the main actors of both negotiation arenas, namely the corporatist actors 
and the political parties. 
The reform processes revealed a surprising flexibility in Swiss decisional 
procedures confronted with crisis management. Armingeon (1998) argues that 
the institutions of corporatism and consociationalism, which are deeply rooted 
in Switzerland, still provide a favorable framework to cope with the challenges 
of changing socio-economic circumstances. We found that in major social policy 
reforms, partisan consociationalism proved more effective for problem solving 
than interest groups’ corporatism. In general, the literature on corporatism and 
on policy concertation focuses on trade unions, employers’ organizations, or 
more recently on the government as key actors, but it often does not pay much 
attention to the role of the parliamentary arena. This can be explained by the fact 
that parliaments are generally considered as places where corporatist agreements 
are routinely ratified. Although in other small corporatist countries it was mainly 
the government, as opposed to the parliament for Switzerland, whose role was 
strengthened, these countries seem to exhibit similar patterns of change in terms 
of an enhanced role for political parties, as opposed to interest organizations and 
corporatist bodies. In the recent literature on welfare reforms, the role of partisan 
politics has been reasserted (Green-Pedersen 2001 and Ross 2000). Our article 
on Switzerland sought to identify how parties come to matter: because they 
encompass wider interests than the corporatist actors, and because they act under 
the imminent shadow of the referendum, they tend to gain influence on social 
policy issues. We believe that it should be checked in further comparative studies 
– particularly in the field of social policy, a traditional domain of social partners 
concertation – whether it is partisan executives or parliaments that are becoming 
more powerful players than interest groups. Furthermore, research should not 
only be focused on the newly empowered governmental or parliamentary arena, 
but should also scrutinize its interactions with the corporatist arena and explore 
the reasons for possible changes in them.
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Appendix: List of elite interviews 
All interviews have been conducted between June and August 2001.
1) Vice-director of the Federal Office of Social Insurance (OFAS). Responsible for the 
pension reform of 1995.
2) Director of the Federal Office of Industry, Crafts and Labour (OFIAMT). 
Responsible for the unemployment insurance reform of 1995.
3) Secretary of the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions (USS). Responsible for the 
unemployment insurance reform of 1995.
4) Secretary of the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions (USS) (1993-94). Responsible 
for the pension reform of 1995.
5) President of the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions (USS) (1994-98) and member 
of the parliamentary committees in charge of the pension and the unemployment 
insurance reforms of 1995 for the Social Democratic Party (PSS). 
6) Director of the Union of Swiss Employers’ Associations (UPS) (1970-93) and 
member of the parliamentary committees in charge of the pension reform of 1995 
for the Radical Democratic Party (PRD). 
7) Director of the Union of Swiss Employers’ Associations (UPS) (1993-). Responsible 
for the unemployment insurance reform of 1995. 
8) Chair of the parliamentary committee in charge of the unemployment 
insurance reform of 1995 for the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).
9) Member of the parliamentary committee in charge of the pension reform of 
1995 for the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). 
10) Member of the parliamentary committee in charge of the pension reform of 
1995 for the Social Democratic Party (PSS). 
11) Member of the parliamentary committee in charge of the pension reform of 
1995 for the Radical Democratic Party (PRD). 
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Von Korporatismus zur Parteipolitik: Sozialpolitik unter Druck in 
der Schweiz
Die neuere Literatur zur Entwicklung neokorporatistischer Abkommen 
hat für eine Reihe von westeuropäischen Ländern mit einer langen 
Tradition korporatistischer Verhandlungen eine Schwächung der Kon-
zertierungsmechanismen in den 1990er Jahren im Bereich der Sozial- und 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik festgestellt. In dies Artikel zeigen wir für die Schweiz 
eine ähnliche Tendenz auf und führen diese auf drei Faktoren zurück: 1) 
Finanzieller Druck auf die Sozialwerke und ideologische Polarisierung 
verhindern die Kompromissfindung; 2) das Aufkommen neuer sozialer 
Bedürfnisse und Forderungen stellt die Homogenität und Legitimität der 
Dachverbände in Frage und schwächt insofern ihre Verhandlungsmacht; 
3) zunehmende mediale Abdeckung der Entscheidungsprozesse bricht 
die traditionell geschlossene und selektive Sphäre der korporatistischen 
Verhandlungen auf. Dies erschwert das Aushandeln von sozial-
partnerschaftlichen Abkommen.  Der Einfluss dieser Faktoren auf den 
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Entscheidungsprozess wird für den Fall der schweizerischen Sozialpolitik 
untersucht, in der die Sozialpartner immer eine sehr wichtige Rolle gespielt 
haben. Die empirische Untersuchung basiert auf einem longitudinalen 
Vergleich zweier wichtiger Felder der Sozialpolitik: es werden Reformen 
der Arbeitslosenversicherung und der AHV in den 1970er und 1990er 
Jahren verglichen. Dabei wird deutlich, dass sich der entscheidende Ort 
der Politikformulierung von der vorparlamentarischen Arena der Verbände 
in die Arena der Parteipolitik verschoben hat. Im Parlament gelang es den 
Parteien, breit abgestützte Vorlagen zu formulieren, insbesondere durch 
den Einschluss von Kompensationen an gesellschaftliche Gruppen, die von 
neuen sozialen Risiken besonders stark betroffen sind. 
Du corporatisme à la politique partisane: les politiques sociales sous 
pression en Suisse
La récente littérature sur les arrangements néo-corporatistes dans le 
domaine des politiques sociales et du marché du travail a mis évidence 
un déclin de la concertation dans les pays européens avec une longue 
tradition de négociations corporatistes. L’article identifie une tendance 
similaire en Suisse, qui peut être expliquée par trois facteurs: 1) Pressions au 
retranchement des politiques sociales et polarisation idéologique qui rendent 
plus difficiles les compromis; 2) Emergence de nouvelles demandes sociales 
qui déstabilise l’homogénéité et la légitimité des organisations faîtières et qui 
remet en cause leur pouvoir de négociation; 3) Une couverture médiatique 
de plus en plus forte qui rend plus transparente la sphère des négociations 
néo-corporatistes et affaiblit la capacité des partenaires sociaux à trouver 
des solutions de compromis. L’impact de ces facteurs est analysé pour le cas 
suisse dans le domaine des politiques sociales, où les partenaires sociaux ont 
toujours joué un rôle central. L’analyse empirique porte sur une comparaison 
diachronique des réformes de deux politiques sociales majeures: l’assurance-
chômage et l’AVS durant les années 1970 et 1990. Au cours de la dernière 
décennie, le lieu décisif du processus de décision s’est déplacé de la phase 
pré-parlementaire des négociations entre partenaires sociaux à l’arène 
partisane. Au Parlement, les partis politiques furent capables de formuler 
des propositions de réforme soutenues par une large coalition, grâce aux 
compensations octroyées aux groupes sociaux particulièrement vulnérables 
par rapport aux nouveaux risques sociaux. 
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